In a positive step toward expanding clean energy access, the World Bank lifted its longstanding ban on financing nuclear energy projects on June 11. World Bank President Ajay Banga had been advocating for this change since assuming his position in 2023. He doubled down in April 2025 by calling for an “all of the above” energy strategy that includes nuclear “where it makes sense.”
The Bank jumping into the nuclear financing game is uniquely popular among its diverse shareholders—reflecting the growing global support for nuclear energy. At COP28, 25 countries, including some developing countries, pledged to triple nuclear energy capacity by 2050. Clean energy advocates support nuclear energy’s scalability as a key path to meet net-zero targets. Developing countries like the potential for nuclear energy to meet their enormous energy needs. With 600 million people still lacking electricity in Africa alone, commercializing affordable, flexible, and scalable nuclear technologies, notably Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), holds promise. Even longstanding naysayers Germany and Japan have come around to expanding global nuclear energy access.
But it was the Trump administration’s deep advocacy for nuclear energy financing that really added momentum to the Bank’s policy change. US interest in expanded global nuclear energy is driven by the potential benefits to American firms. President Trump’s May 2025 executive orders made this clear, signaling an intent to “fully leverage the resources of the federal government to enable the U.S. nuclear industry to compete for commercial civil nuclear projects worldwide,” while citing bilateral financing tools. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent extended the focus to the World Bank, calling on the Executive Board “to remove prohibitions on support for nuclear energy, which could revolutionize energy supply for many emerging markets.”
Why is the World Bank an important part of the US nuclear energy strategy? Right now, the United States faces stiff global competition in developing nuclear technologies, particularly SMRs, with China and Russia both having operationalized commercial SMR reactors domestically and actively pursuing exports of these technologies. Both countries offer foreign partners not only the technology but also built-in financing options. The Bank getting in the game will provide another option for foreign governments that need financing—thus helping to level the playing field for US companies.
World Bank support for nuclear energy will not begin automatically. In recent remarks, Banga said that he expects the Bank to first finalize a partnership with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to bring expertise on safeguards and regulatory policy. Then the Bank, with the IAEA technical support, will gradually finance the extension of existing nuclear power plants in emerging markets; provide technical assistance to countries interested in building new nuclear energy capacity; and standardize policy, regulations, and technology that will help scale SMR technology.
Banga’s plan is highly ambitious for an institution that has not financed a nuclear energy project in 60 years. It will take a lot of work internally to build institutional capacity. This includes hiring public and private sector experts, identifying which standards will guide the Bank’s engagement, and building technical assistance and project preparation tools. Shareholders should demand concrete implementation plans, while affording management flexibility on operational budgets to hire experts.
As the loudest voice championing this policy change, continued and creative US leadership can help to smooth the implementation of the Bank’s ambition in this space. And a multifaceted US-World Bank partnership on nuclear energy will be mutually beneficial. For developing countries, additional technical support and financing optionality will expand energy access. For Banga and management, it will help drive forward this work with shareholders and internally at the Bank. For the Trump administration, it will give the US a strong voice as the Bank develops standards for future financing. Specifically, the US should consider the following actions:
- Design and establish a trust fund to facilitate early World Bank engagement. A model could be the Resilient and Inclusive Supply-Chain Enhancement (RISE) trust fund that provides knowledge, technical assistance, and finance facilitation for critical minerals. Similar to nuclear energy, the Bank did not have recent experience financing mining projects. RISE is a way to get the Bank back in that business; and the donors to RISE were able to shape how the Bank is engaging in that space. A similar nuclear trust fund would enable the US to shape Bank nuclear engagement from the ground floor.
- Deliver significant financing to the trust fund and other vehicles for catalytic investments. The US has existing avenues to support the Bank’s technical assistance and financing capacity. First, Treasury International Assistance Programs (TIAP) can support a loan guarantee to the Bank. Congress has already provided funds and authorities for Treasury to guarantee billions of dollars of lending through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which could be used to expand access for nuclear projects, at an extremely low cost to taxpayers. The administration’s fiscal year (FY) 2026 budget request would extend TIAP authority and enable loan guarantees to the Bank’s private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), allowing for the potential creation of a pool of catalytic private sector funding. Finally, Congress appropriated $125 million in FY 2025 for the Clean Technology Fund (CTF). Although currently proposed for rescission the administration could work with the Bank and the CTF to use the funding to creatively support early-stage nuclear capacity and/or projects.
- Use the 2026 US G20 year—in partnership with the French G7 year—to build support, unlock barriers, and/or address emerging issues. For example, the Asian Development Bank is now reportedly considering lifting its own nuclear energy ban, perhaps a signal that other development finance institutions will follow the Bank’s lead. As more institutions move to prioritize nuclear energy, the G20 could provide much-needed coordination between the development finance institutions on standards and modalities for engagement.
- Develop a partnership between the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the IFC. DFC has already been building capacity to finance nuclear energy projects. DFC could agree on a partnership arrangement—like the one it has with the Inter-American Development Bank—to share due diligence and co-finance strategic projects.
It is too early to tell what is ultimately in store for the World Bank’s nuclear energy policy. However, the recent shifts, spurred in part by the Trump administration’s advocacy, represent a significant opportunity to deliver on Bessent’s stated desire to “expand US leadership at the international financial institutions.” By doing so, the US can shape global nuclear energy policy in a way that benefits the world, while leveling the playing field for US nuclear energy firms.
Mary Svenstrup is a non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development. She previously was a special assistant to President Biden and senior director for international economics, jointly appointed to the National Security Council and the National Economic Council. In that role, Mary worked to enhance the Biden Administration’s climate and development finance tools and represented the United States as the “sous sherpa” to the G7 and G20. Previously, she was a civil servant at the US Treasury Department for over a decade.